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Game theory is the branch of mathematics in which games are studied: that is, models describing human behaviour. This is a glossary of some terms of the subject.
[edit] Definitions of a game
[edit] Notational conventions
- Real numbers
.
- The set of players
- N.
- Strategy space
, where
- Player i's strategy space
is the space of all possible ways in which player i can play the game.
- A strategy for player i
is an element of .
- complements
an element of , is a tuple of strategies for all players other than i.
- Outcome space
is in most textbooks identical to -
- Payoffs
, describing how much gain (money, pleasure, etc.) the players are allocated by the end of the game.
[edit] Normal form game
A game in normal form is a function:
is a strategy that maximizes player i's payment. Formally, we want:
.
- Coalition
- is any subset of the set of players:
.
players. is a weak dictator if he can guarantee any outcome, but his strategies for doing so might depend on the complement > \forall a \in \mathrm{A}, \; \forall \sigma\ _{-n} \in \Sigma\ ^{-n} \; \exist \sigma\ _n \in \Sigma\ ^n \; s.t. \; \Gamma\ (\sigma\ _{-n},\sigma\ _n) = a </math>
Another way to put it is:
a weak dictator is α-effective for every possible outcome.
A strong dictator is β-effective for every possible outcome.
A game can have no more than one strong dictator. Some games have multiple weak dictators (in rock-paper-scissors both players are weak dictators but none is a strong dictator).
See Effectiveness. Antonym: dummy.
- Dominated outcome
- Given a preference ν on the outcome space, we say that an outcome a is dominated by outcome a is (strictly) dominated if it is (strictly) dominated by some other outcome.
An outcome a is dominated for a coalition S if all players in S prefer some other outcome to a. See also Condorcet winner.
- Dominated strategy
- we say that strategy is (strongly) dominated by strategy
if for any complement strategies tuple , player i benefits by playing . Formally speaking:
and
.
A strategy σ is (strictly) dominated if it is (strictly) dominated by some other strategy.
- Dummy
- A player i is a dummy if he has no effect on the outcome of the the complement of S, the members of S can answer with strategies that ensure outcome a.
- Finite game
- is a game with finitely many players, each of which has a finite set of strategies.
- Grand coalition
- refers to the coalition containing all players. In cooperative games it is often assumed that the grand coalition forms and the purpose of the game is to find stable imputations.
- Mixed strategy
- for player i is a probability distribution P on
. It is understood that player i chooses a strategy randomly according to P.
- Mixed Nash Equilibrium
- Same as Pure Nash Equilibrium, defined on the space of mixed strategies. Every finite game has Mixed Nash Equilibria.
- Pareto efficiency
- An the possible outcomes of the game. See allocation of goods.
- Pure Nash Equilibrium
- An element
of the strategy space of a game is a pure expected outcome. There are more than a few definitions of value, describing different methods of obtaining a solution to the game.
- Veto
- A veto denotes the ability (or right) of some player to prevent a specific alternative from being the outcome of the game. A player who has that ability is called a veto player.
Antonym: Dummy.
- Weakly acceptable game
- is a game that has pure nash equilibria some of which are pareto efficient.
- Zero sum game
- is a game in which the allocation is constant over one player's gain is another player's loss. Most classical board games (e.g. chess, checkers) are zero sum.
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