Galen Strawson

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Galen John Strawson (born 1952) is a British philosopher and literary critic who works primarily on philosophy of mind, metaphysics (including free will, panpsychism, the mind-body problem, and the self), John Locke, David Hume and Kant. He was educated at the Dragon School, Oxford (1959-65), from where he won a scholarship to Winchester College (1965-8). He left school at sixteen, after completing his ‘A Levels’ and winning a place at the University of Cambridge. At Cambridge he read Islamic Studies (1969-71), Social and Political Science (1971-2), and Moral Sciences (1972-73), before moving to the University of Oxford, where he received his BPhil in philosophy in 1977 and his DPhil in philosophy in 1983. He also spent a year as an auditeur libre at the Ecole normale supérieure in Paris and at the Université de Paris (1) as a French Government Scholar (1977-8).

Strawson taught at the University of Oxford from 1979-2000, first as a Stipendiary Lecturer at University College (1979-80), Exeter College (1980-83), St Hugh’s College (1983-5), New College (1985-6), and St Hilda’s College (1986-7), and then, from 1987 on, as Fellow and Tutor of Jesus College Oxford. In 1993 he was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Research School of Social Sciences, Canberra. He has also taught as a Visiting Professor at NYU (1997) and Rutgers University (2000). He is currently professor of philosophy at the University of Reading and is a regular visitor at the City University of New York Graduate Center Philosophy Program, where he was Distinguished Professor of Philosophy from 2004-6. He has been a consultant editor at The Times Literary Supplement for many years, and a regular book reviewer for The Observer, The Sunday Times, The Independent, The Financial Times and The Guardian.

Galen Strawson is the son of the celebrated philosopher Peter Frederick Strawson. He has five children, Emilie, Tom, Georgia, Harry and Ivo.

Contents

[edit] Free will

In the free will debate, Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. He argues for this position with what he calls his "basic argument", which aims to show that no-one is ever ultimately morally responsible for their actions, and hence that no one has free will in the sense that usually concerns us. In its simplest form, the Basic Argument runs thus:

  1. We do what we do, in a given situation, because we are what we are.
  2. In order to be ultimately responsible for what we do, we have to be ultimately responsible for what we are — at least in certain crucial mental respects.
  3. But we cannot, as the first point avers, be ultimately responsible for what we are, because, simply, we are what we are; we cannot be causa sui.
  4. Therefore, we cannot be ultimately responsible for what we do.[1]


This argument is cited in the Wikipedia article about Frankfurt's counterexamples as a critique of Harry G. Frankfurt's main argument.

[edit] References

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ Strawson, Galen. "Free Will" in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig (1998); "The Bounds of Freedom" in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (2002).

[edit] Books

[edit] Selected Articles

  • "Red and 'Red'" (1989),Synthese 78 pp 193-232
  • "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility" (1994), Philosophical Studies 75 pp 5-24
  • "'The self' " (1997) Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 pp 405-28
  • "Real Materialism" (2003), in Chomsky and his Critics ed. L. Antony & N. Hornstein (Oxford: Blackwell), pp 49-88
  • "Mental ballistics: the involuntariness of spontaneity" (2003) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society pp 227-56
  • "Against narrativity" (2004) Ratio 16 pp 428-52
  • "Episodic ethics" (2005) in "Narrative and Understanding Person" ed. D. Hutto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp 85-115

[edit] External links

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