Battle of Mycale

El directorio enciclopédico desde la Wikipedia.

Contents

Battle of Mycale
Part of the Persian Wars

Part of Mount Mycale, viewed from the ruins of Priene
Date August 27, 479 BC
Location Mycale, Ionia
Result Greek victory.
Territorial
changes
Persia loses the Ionian islands.
Belligerents
Greek city-states Achaemenid Empire
Commanders
Leotychides Artaÿntes
Strength
40,000 men,
110 ships [1]
60,000 men,
300 ships [2]
Casualties and losses
Heavy Heavy

The Battle of Mycale, (Ancient Greek;Μάχη τῆς Μυκάλης; Mache tes Mycales), was one of the two major battles that ended the Persian invasion of Greece, during the Greco-Persian Wars. The battle took place on or about August 27, 479 BC on the slopes of Mount Mycale, in mainland Ionia opposite the island of Samos.

Mycale resulted in the destruction of the main Persian forces in Ionia, as well as their Mediterranean fleet.

The Battle of Plataea on the same day on the Greek mainland was a victory as well, and the Persians were forced to leave both Greece and Ionia and retreat inland, thereby ending Persian rule.

[edit] Sources

Main article: Herodotus

Nearly all of the sources for the account of the battle come ultimately from the Greek historian Herodotus, writing in his 'Histories'. Historically, Herodotus has often been derided, even by other ancient writers. However, recent archaeological finds have tended to confirm specific claims made by Herodotus, and have done much to restore his reputation.[3] Nevertheless, it remains true that Herodotus often appears to have exaggerated, or simply to have recounted what he was 'told' without much critical appraisal.[4]

[edit] Background

The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499-494 BC. Darius swore revenge on these two city-states, and also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece.[5] A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia.[6]

In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of 'earth and water' in token of their submission to him.[7] Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well.[7] This meant that Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia.[7]

Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos, before receiving the submission of the other Cycladic Islands. The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed.[8] Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon, where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia.[9]

A map showing the Greek world at the time of the battle

Darius therefore began raising a huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition.[5] Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly re-started the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be a full scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state.[10] By early 480 BC, the preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges.[11]

The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for the Greeks to fight the Persians[5]. However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta.[12] Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC,[13] and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other.[5]

Movements to Salamis

The 'Allies' initially adopted a strategy of blocking the land and sea approaches to southern Greece.[14] Thus, in August 480 BC, after hearing of Xerxes's approach, a small Allied army led by the Spartan king Leonidas I blocked the Pass of Thermopylae, whilst an Athenian-dominated navy sailed to the Straits of Artemisium. Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae against the Persians army for six days in total, before being outflanked by a mountain path. Although much of the Greek army retreated, the rearguard of Spartans and Thespians were surrounded and killed.[5] The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium was up to that point a stalemate;[15] however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, they also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point.[16]

The Allied fleet had then sailed from Artemisium to Salamis to assist with the final evacuation of Athens, whilst the mostly Peloponnesian Allied army prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth.[17] Following Thermopylae, the Persian army had proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities which had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae; before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. Xerxes wished for a final crushing defeat of the Allies to finish the conquest of Greece in that campaigning season; conversely the Allies sought a decisive victory over the Persian navy that would guarantee the security of the Peloponnessus.[18] The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis ended in a decisive victory for the Greeks, marking (in retrospect) a turning point in the conflict.[19]

Following the defeat of his navy at the Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Asia with the bulk of the army. He left Mardonius, with handpicked troops, to complete the conquest of Greece the following year.[20] Mardonius evacuated Attica, and over-wintered in Thessaly;[21] with the Athenians then reoccupying their destroyed city.[19] Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the Isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnesus, felt hard done by, and demanded an Allied army march north the following year.[19] When the Allies failed to commit to this, the Athenian fleet refused to join the Allied navy in Spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides, thus skulked off Delos, whilst the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos, both sides unwilling to risk battle.[22] Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the Isthmus was pointless, whilst the Allies refused to send an army outside the Peloponessus.[19]

Mardonius moved to break the stalemate, by offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion to the Athenians (with the aim of removing their fleet from the Allied forces), using Alexander I of Macedon) as intermediate.[22] The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was on hand to hear the offer, but rejected it:

The degree to which we are put in the shadow by the Medes' strength is hardly something you need to bring to our attention. We are already well aware of it. But even so, such is our love of liberty, that we will never surrender.[22]

Athens was thus evacuated again, and the Persians marched south and re-took possession of it. Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with Megara and Plataea sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not.[23] According to Herodotus, the Spartans, who were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus, delayed making a decision until they were persuaded by a guest, Chileos of Tegea, who pointed out the danger to all of Greece if the Athenians surrendered.[24] When, the next day the Athenian emissaries delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already en route; the Spartan army was marching to meet the Persians.[25]

In response, the Athenian navy under Xanthippus joined with the Allied fleet off Delos. They were approached by a delegation from Samos, who suggested that the Ionian cities would revolt if the Allied fleet successfully engaged the Persian fleet.[26] They further more pointed out the poor morale and seaworthyness of the Persian fleet.[26] Leotychides decided to attempt this, and sailed for Samos.[27]

[edit] Prelude

The Greek approach was heard and the Persians in Samos decide to face them on land. They sailed to the nearby peninsula of Mycale just to the east of the city, and formed a wall out of a number of their ships, dragging the rest onto the beach.

[edit] The Battle

When the Greek fleet arrived and found Samos empty, they started a pursuit thinking the Persians were running from battle. The Greeks soon came upon the Persians, already formed up in battle lines on shore. Leotychides yelled to the Ionians in the Persian camp:

Men of Ionia—ye who can hear me speak—do ye take heed to what I say; for the barbarians will not understand a word that I utter. When we join battle with them, before aught else, remember Freedom—and next, recollect our watchword, which is Hebe. If there be any who hear me not, let those who hear report my words to the others.

—Herod. 9.98

Schematic of the Battle of Mycale

Realizing generally what was going on, the Persians disarmed the Samians and sent their enemies, the Milesians, to guard the roads to the rear. Meanwhile the Greeks unloaded their ships and formed up for combat. As usual the Spartans occupied the right wing, placing the Athenians on the left. The Athenians, walking along the beach, found a herald's scepter and thought that it is a divine sign, signifying that the other Greeks had been victorious on the mainland. They then charged forward to the attack alone, and after a short battle the Persians, led by Artaÿntes, were forced to retreat to the fort they had constructed further inland. The Athenians chased them and captured the fort as well. The Persian survivors fled, only to find that the Milesian rear-guard had turned against them as well, and few survived to eventually reach Sardis.

[edit] Aftermath

Main article: Greco-Persian Wars

When the Spartans arrived the Persian camp was looted and their beached ships destroyed. Returning to Samos they then discussed their next moves. The Spartans proposed that they evacuate the cities of the Ionian Greeks and bring the population to the Greek mainland, as they did not consider it worth their trouble to defend the Ionians every time they were attacked. The Athenians, however, objected to losing their colonies, and accepted the Ionian Greeks in a league against Persia.

With the Persians defeated, the Spartans returned to the mainland. The Ionian cities were now in league with Athens however, forming what could only be considered an Athenian Empire. Previously beholden to Sparta, Athens started exerting an increasing amount of independence, eventually resulting in the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

[edit] References

  1. ^ Peter Green, The Greco-Persian Wars
  2. ^ Oliver Goldsmith, History of Ancient Greece
  3. ^ Holland, p377
  4. ^ John Boardman. The Cambridge Ancient History, p532. 1988 ISBN 0521228042. [1]
  5. ^ a b c d e Persian Fire. Holland, T. Abacus, ISBN 978-0-349-11717-1
  6. ^ Herodotus VI, 44 [2]
  7. ^ a b c Hollan, pp178-179
  8. ^ Herodotus VI, 101 [3]
  9. ^ Herodotus, VI, 113 [4]
  10. ^ Holland, pp213-214
  11. ^ Herodotus VII, 35 [5]
  12. ^ Herodotus VII, 31 VII, 32
  13. ^ Herodotus VII, 145 [6]
  14. ^ Holland, pp255-257
  15. ^ Herodotus VIII, 18 [7]
  16. ^ Herodotus, VIII, 21 [8]
  17. ^ Herodotus VIII, 71 [9]
  18. ^ Holland, p303
  19. ^ a b c d Holland, p333-335
  20. ^ Holland, pp327-329
  21. ^ Holland, p330
  22. ^ a b c Holland, pp336-338
  23. ^ Herodotus IX, 7 [10]
  24. ^ Herodotus IX, 6-9 [11]
  25. ^ Herodotus IX, 10 [12]
  26. ^ a b Herodotus IX, 90
  27. ^ Herodotus IX, 91

[edit] Further reading

[edit] External links

Página espejo de la Wikipedia
Directorio de Enlaces Directorio dmoz Directorio espejo dmoz Pedro Bernardo